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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. : 
CHAD STATEN, : 
Defendant/Appellant. ; 
; Case No. 970490 
: Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTION OF Tgg UTAH SUPREME COURT 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated Section 
78-2a-3(2) (e) . 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in its denial of Staten's 
motion to suppress evidence and in finding the warrantless search 
of Staten's motel room to be justified by "exigent circumstances" 
or as a proper search incident-to-arrest? "The factual findings 
of a trial court that underlie its decision to grant or deny a 
motion to suppress will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly 
erroneous. The trial court's *legal conclusions are reviewed for 
correctness, with a measure of discretion given to the trial 
judge's application of the legal standard to the facts.'" State 
v- Wellsr 928 P.2d 386, 388 (Utah App. 1996) (citations omitted). 
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This issue was preserved in a pre-trial motions and at a 
suppression hearing (R. 22, 29-33, 50-63, 144-189). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Utah Constitution, Article I, section 14 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue 
but upon probable cause supported by oath and affirmation 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
person or thing to be seized. 
STATEMENT Q F T g g C^SS 
Jt. Nature of the Case 
Chad Staten appeals from the judgment, sentence and order of 
Probation by the Honorable Lynn W. Davis, Fourth District Court, 
on September 15, 1997, after the denial of Staten1s Motion to 
Suppress Evidence and the entry of a condition 1 plea to 
Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute in 
a Drug Free Zone, a first degree felony, and Possession of a 
Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person, a Third Degree Felony. 
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B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Staten was charged by information filed on or about January 
14, 1997, with three violations of the controlled substances act 
and possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person (R. 
6-7) . 
After a preliminary hearing (R. 16-18, 103-142) and the 
entry of "not guilty" pleas at arraignment (R. 20-21), Staten 
filed a Motion to Suppress the Evidence under the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States and Article I, Section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution (R. 22-33). Staten argued that the warrantless 
search of his motel room was without his consent and was not 
justified by "exigent circumstances" (Id.). 
On May 9, 1997, a suppression hearing was conducted before 
Judge Davis and the matter was taken under advisement (R. 47-48, 
144-190). The trial court subsequently denied in part, and 
granted in part, Staten' Motion to Suppress (R. 66-74). 
Staten entered a conditional plea of "guilty" to Possession 
of Methamphetamine with Intent to Distribute in a Drug Free Zone, 
a first degree felony, and Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a 
Restricted Person, a third degree felony (R. 84-87); and he was 
sentenced to thirty-six months probation and a year in the Utah 
County Jail (R. 90-91). On October 14, 1997, Staten filed a 
Notice of Appeal with the Fourth District Court challenging the 
trial court's denial of his motion to suppress (R. 98-99). 
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
At approximately 7:00 p.m. on December 22, 1996, Officer 
Greg Henigar of the Provo City Police Department was dispatched 
to the Motel 6 based upon information concerning a run-away 
female juvenile (R. 158-60). Dispatch informed Henigar that the 
juvenile was staying at the motel "with a person by the first 
name of Chad" (R. 161). 
Henigar responded to the Motel 6 and gave the front desk the 
information he had from dispatch (R. 161). The front desk 
informed him that a female matching the given description and a 
male by the name of Chad had been at the motel (R. 161). Henigar 
then went outside and conducted surveillence on the hotel room he 
had been given by the front desk (R. 162). 
Henigar called the motel room from his patrol car and spoke 
with a male who informed Henigar that the female juvenile was not 
in the room but that she would be back soon (R. 162-63) . Henigar 
testified that he also asked the male if he had "some stuff" (R. 
164). Henigar testified that the male replied "Yes, I think I 
know what you need" (R. 164). After the phone call, Henigar 
called for back-up and was joined by Officer Ashcroft (R. 164-
65) . 
Henigar and Ashcroft then observed a vehicle drive-up and 
saw a female go inside the motel room (R. 165). Henigar then 
phoned the room again, spoke with the same unidentified male and 
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asked to speak with the juvenile female (R. 165) . After speaking 
briefly with the female, Henigar spoke again with the male (R. 
166). Henigar testified that he asked the male "What can you get 
me?" to which the male replied, "I can get you some bitch" (R. 
166). Henigar testified that "bitch" is a street name for 
methamphetamine (Id.). 
Several minutes later, the female exited the room and was 
stopped by Henigar and Ashcroft (R. 166). Henigar asked for her 
name and was informed that she was the female juvenile for whom 
he had been looking (R. 167). Henigar took her into custody, put 
her in the backseat of Ashcroft!s vehicle, and asked her what was 
on her person (R. 167). The female juvenile replied that "she 
had some smokes" and some methamphetamine which she then removed 
from her underwear (R. 167). The juvenile informed Henigar that 
she got the drugs from the motel room "for a guy who wanted it" 
(R. 168). Soon after the juvenile's arrest her brother and his 
friend approached the scene (R. 170). 
Heningar had the friend, Tim Hansen, assist him in 
approaching the motel room (R. 170-71). Hansen knocked on the 
door while Henigar stood off to the side (R. 171). Staten 
answered the door and Heningar moved to the front and began 
speaking with him (R. 171). 
Henigar testified that when the door opened, he looked 
around the room from outside and noticed some scales in plain 
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view on the desk next to the door and what appeared to be a 
marijuana pipe on a nightstand (R. 171). Henigar then asked 
Staten for consent to retrieve the pipe (R. 172). Henigar 
testified that Staten gave him consent (R. 172). 
Henigar then walked into the room, picked-up the pipe, and 
found it be a butane nozzle (R. 172). At this point, Henigar 
noticed several butane torches and butane tanks in the desk area 
as well as some baggies (R. 172). 
Henigar then "froze the environment" to protect the scene, 
placed Staten in hand-cuffs, and waited for assistance (R. 173, 
175). Henigar left the room for a period of time in the charge 
of Officer Woodall (R. 180). At some point NET officers arrived 
at the scene (R. 176); and methamphetamine and marijuana were 
found in a planner tucked in between the mattress, and a loaded 
weapon was also found in the room (R. 119, 130, 174, 176). 
Staten was placed under arrest (R. 176). 
Tim Hansen testified that on the day in question, he and the 
juvenile female's brother were looking for the female in the 
motel area of South University Avenue in Provo (R. 147). When 
they arrived at the Motel 6, Hansen testified that law 
enforcement personnel were already present and that the female 
juvenile was being arrested (R. 147-48). 
Hansen testified that one of the officers had him knock on 
the door of the motel room "so Chad would answer it" (R. 148). 
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Hansen testified that he did not know "Chad" (R. 148). When 
Hansen knocked, Chad opened the door (R. 148-49). Then Henigar 
"arrested him. He was talking to him and asked him if he could 
look around and Chad said that no, you need a warrant" (R. 149). 
Then Hansen testified: "I seen what looked like a marijuana pipe 
in the corner. I pointed it out to him and he asked him if we 
could look and Chad said that yes, you can go over and look at 
it. It is not a pipe. He walked in and picked it up and looked 
at it and put it down. It is not a pipe" (R. 149). Hansen 
testified that at this point, he had seen nothing else that might 
be related to drugs (R. 150). Hansen also testified that he 
believed Staten was already hand-cuffed when Henigar retrieved 
the alleged pipe (R. 153). Hansen testified that he could not 
recall if Henigar informed Staten that he was placing the 
handcuffs on him for "officer safety" (R. 155). 
Staten testified that when Hansen and Henigar came to the 
door of the motel room, Henigar asked if there was a pipe on the 
table, but not for consent to search the room (R. 184). Staten 
also testified that he told Henigar that he would need a warrant 
to look in the room (R. 184). Staten did tell Henigar that he 
could look at the pipe and that he planned on retrieving it for 
Henigar, but before that happened, Henigar came into the room (R. 
184-85). 
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Staten was hand-cuffed and he testified that approximately 
twenty minutes later Officer Billings from NET arrived (R. 186). 
Staten also testified that Henigar at some point left the room 
and that at some point he was left alone in the room (R. 186). 
On May 9, 1997, a suppression hearing was conducted before 
Judge Davis and the matter was taken under advisement (R. 47-48, 
144-190). The trial court subsequently denied in part, and 
granted in part, Staten' Motion to Suppress (R. 66-74). 
Relevant to the issues of this appeal, the trial court found 
that Staten's failure to consent to the search of the room was 
not dispositive because "evidence was in plain view from the 
doorway" and "there was ample probable cause to effectuate an 
arrest of the defendant, and the officer could have entered the 
room for that purpose without consent or invitation by the 
defendant" (R. 70). The trial court also found that the seizure 
of the drugs found in a planner that was "tucked between the 
mattresses one-half way between the headboard and the foot of the 
bed" was justified under an exigent circumstances theory or as 
part of a legitimate search incident to an arrest (R. 69, 71, 
119) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Warrantless searches of homes—or motel rooms—are violative 
of Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the Fourth 
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Amendment to the United States Constitution unless conducted 
pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. 
In this case, the trial court concluded that the warrantless 
searches of Staten's motel room were justified either under an 
"exigent circumstances" theory or as a proper search incident to 
arrest. Staten asserts that the trial court's decision is 
erroneous. One, because no exigent circumstances were present at 
the time of the second search which negated the need for a 
warrant. Two, because the second search did not meet the 
requirements of a proper search incident to arrest. It was not 
necessary for the protection of the police or the preservation of 
the evidence nor were the items seized within the immediate 
control of Staten at the time of their seizure. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS DENIAL OF STATEN'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT THE 
WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF STATEN' S MOTEL ROOM WAS REASONABLE 
Both Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protect 
individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. These 
constitutional protections extend to unreasonable searches of 
motel rooms. Stoner v. California. 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964). 
See also, Hoffa v. United States. 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966) ("A 
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hotel room can clearly be the object of Fourth Amendment 
protection as much as a home or an office"). In addition, 
"warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless undertaken 
pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant requirement." 
State v. Brown. 853 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 1992) (citation omitted). 
Moreover, the "State must demonstrate *that the circumstances of 
the seizure constitute an exception to the warrant requirement.'" 
Wells. 928 P.2d at 389 (citation omitted). 
In this case, the State conducted two warrantless searches 
of Staten's motel room. The first occurred when Henigar entered 
the room and found various items or paraphernalia and a weapon 
after placing Staten in handcuffs (R. 172, 173). The second 
warrantless search occurred when Henigar and other officers 
returned to the motel room and conducted a more thorough 
inventory search of the room—including a search in between the 
mattresses where a planner containing methamphetamine was found 
(R. 119, 130, 174, 176). 
Staten asserts that the trial court erred in concluding that 
the State had sustained its burden of establishing that the 
circumstances surrounding these searches of Staten's motel room 
constitute an exception to the warrant requirement under either 
an "exigent circumstances" theory or as a proper search incident 
to arrest. Staten particularly challenges the trial court's 
conclusion that the second search of the room—which resulted in 
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the discovery of the methamphetamine and which was conducted 
long-after Staten had been handcuffed—was justified. 
A. The warrantless searches of Staten's motel room were not 
justified by "exigent circumstances." 
A warrantless search of a residence or a motel room is 
"constitutionally permissible where probable cause and exigent 
circumstances are proven." State v. Yoder. 935 P.2d 534, 540 
(Utah App. 1997). Such an exception exists to prevent physical 
harm to law enforcement personnel or others, the destruction of 
evidence, or the escape of the suspect. Yoder, 935 P.2d at 540 
(citing State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9f 13 (Utah App. 1993)). 
However, "exigent circumstances exist Aonly when the inevitable 
delay incident to obtaining a warrant must give way to an urgent 
need for immediate action.'" Wells. 928 P.2d at 389 (quoting 
United States v. Satterfielri. 743 F.2d 827, 844 (11th Cir. 
1984)). 
In State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9 (Utah App. 1993), this court 
concluded "[t]he existence of exigent circumstances must be based 
on the reasonable belief of the police officer." 859 P.2d at 18. 
Moreover, "the mere possibility that a suspect may have a weapon 
or that evidence might be destroyed is insufficient." WeiIsf 928 
P.2d at 389 (citations omitted). In this case, any initial 
exigencies had dissipated at the time of the second search. See, 
Wellsr 928 P.2d at 389. One, Henigar had already done a cursory 
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search of the room for weapons and officer safety. Two, Staten 
had already been placed in handcuffs. Three, the motel room had 
been frozen and there was no danger that evidence would be 
destroyed before a warrant could be obtained. 
In State v. Wellsr this court concluded that the trial court 
erred in failing to suppress cocaine which was found in the 
lining of defendant's jacket after officers had executed arrest 
warrants on the defendant and handcuffed both suspects at the 
home. 928 P.2d at 389. In its decision this court noted "The 
record relfects that both suspects were handcuffed and in custody 
when the cocaine was seized.... The officers had controlled the 
initially chaotic situation by the time they searched the jacket. 
Therefore, the initial exigencies which had dissipated by the 
time of the search, could not have justified the cocaine 
seizure." Wells, 928 P.2d at 389. 
Unlike the suspects in Wells. Staten was never anything but 
cooperative with the police. He never made any attempt to escape 
or to harm the officers or to destroy evidence. However, this 
case is similar to the circumstances in Wells because by the time 
other officers arrived at the scene—and by the time the 
mattresses were searched and the methamphetamine located—any 
initial exigencies had dissipated. Accordingly, Staten urges 
this court to conclude that the trial court erred in finding that 
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"exigent circumstances" justified the second warrantless search 
of Staten's motel room. 
B. The trial court erred in concluding that the second 
warrantless search of Staten's motel room was a proper 
search incident to arrest. 
As an alternative to its "exigent circumstances" theory, the 
trial court concluded that the second warrantless search of 
Staten's motel room was a proper search incident to arrest. As 
set forth supra, two warrantless searches of Staten's motel room 
were made by officers. 
The second search, which was conducted by Henigar and 
subsequently NET officers, is at issue here. This search was 
conducted long-after Staten had been handcuffed and taken into 
police custody; and it centers on the officers' search of the 
mattresses whereat methamphetamine was located inside of a 
planner which was "tucked between the mattresses one-half way 
between the headboard and the foot of the bed" (R. 71). 
Warrantless searches incident to a lawful arrest are 
permitted "when reasonable and necessary to (1) protect the 
police officer or third persons (the search and seizure of 
weapons) and (2) prevent the destruction of evidence that is 
within the immediate control of the arrestee." State v. Austin, 
584 P.2d 853, 855 (Utah 1978) (citing Chimel v. California, 395 
U.S. 752 (1969). 
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In Austin, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the trial court's 
conclusion that evidence found in a hotel trash linking the 
suspects to a robbery was properly obtained as a search incident 
to arrest. The court based its decision on several factors: One, 
the search was restricted to a single room. 584 P.2d at 856, 
Two, an attempt had already been made to destroy the evidence at 
issue. 584 P.2d at 587. Three, the evidence was found in a 
trash can and could have been inadvertantly destroyed by hotel 
personnel. Id. Four, because there could be "no assumption that 
the receipts would remain in the same place until they could 
return with a proper warrant. Id. 
Unlike Austinf the search of Staten's motel room may or may 
not have been limited to a single room. The trial court's ruling 
acknowledges this factual uncertainty: "[T]he State fails to 
produce sufficient evidence regarding the motel room layout; were 
there two rooms... or only one room?" (R. 68). Likewise, there 
had been no attempt by Staten to destroy evidence. Finally, 
motel personnel had been apprised of the situation and were 
working in tandem with law enforcement personnel. Therefore, 
evidence was not likely to be inadvertently destroyed before a 
warrant could be obtained. 
In short, in this case this was no concern for officer 
safety or the destruction of evidence when officers engaged in 
the second warrantless search of Staten's motel room. In 
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addition, Staten asserts that the drugs found in the planner 
during this second search were not in his "immediate control" as 
required for a proper warrantless search incident to arrest. 
In State v. Wells, 928 P.2d 386 (Utah App. 1996), this court 
set forth factors for determining whether items seized in a 
warrantless search incident to arrest were within a defendant's 
control: One, "whether or not the arrestee was placed in some 
form of restraints." 928 P.2d at 391. In this case, Staten had 
been handcuffed and taken into custody long before this second 
search occurred (R. 71). 
Two, "the position of the officer vis-a-vis the defendant in 
relation to the place searched." Id. The defendant was 
handcuffed and seated in a chair with at least three officers in 
the motel room when the second search occurred (R. 71). 
Three, "the ease or difficulty of gaining access to the 
searched area or item." Wellsr 928 P.2d at 391. The planner 
containing the methamphetamine was found in between the 
mattresses—an area in which Staten was not likely to have access 
to given his custodial status and the number of officers present. 
Four, "the number of officers present in relation to the 
number of arrestees or other persons." 928 P.2d at 391. In this 
case there was one arrestee and several officers. 
Because there was no danger to officer safety or no 
possibility of the destruction of evidence, and because the 
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evidence found in the second search was not in the immediate 
control of the defendant, Staten asks this court to conclude that 
the second warrantless search of his motel room was not justified 
as a proper search incident to arrest. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Staten respectfully asks that this Court conclude that the 
trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and in 
concluding that the warrantless searches of his motel room were 
justified either under an "exigent circumstances'' theory or as a 
proper search incident to arrest. Accordingly, Staten asks that 
this court reverse his conviction and remand the matter to the 
district court with directions that Staten's plea may be 
withdrawn and with orders to suppress the illegally obtained 
evidence. 
is-ZZ. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED th s / / day of February, 1998 
Ih'^y^Ja^d. 
Margaret P. Lindsay 
Counsel for Staten 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Brief Of Appellant to the Appeals 
Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor, 
16 
P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this /*? day of 
February, 1998. 
->—3 -' ~yry^A ,J ?".-<• 
17 
ADDENDA 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UT/JU'VuNTV f ' \ "EOF UTAH 
5iAiJ2 , 0 1 U i A H 
vs. 
CHAD STATEN 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
CASE NO. 971400044 
DATE: JULY 15, 1997 
JUDGE: LYNN W. DAVIS 
CLERK: SGJ 
Chad Staten is charged with Possession of Methamphetamine with Intent to 
Distribute in a Drug Free Zone, a First Degree Felony; Possession of Marijuana with Intent to 
Distribute in a Drug Free Zone, a Second Degree Felony; Possession of Paraphernalia in a 
Drug Free Zone, a Class A Misdemeanor; and Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by 
Restricted Person, a Third Degree Felony. 
A preliminary hearing was conducted on May 23, 1997. The Court found that there 
was probable cause that the offenses were committed and that the defendant committed the 
offenses. 
The defendant filed a Motion to Suppress on March 26, 1997, supported by a 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities. The State of Utah filed a Response to Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress on May 5, 1997. 
A suppression hearing was conducted on May 9, 1997, and the defense sought leave 
to file a reply memorandum. A Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress was filed on June 4, 1997. The State of Utah filed a Request to Submit For 
Decision on June 12, 1997. This judge conducted both the preliminary hearing and 
suppression hearing. The defendant has relied upon a transcript of both hearings and the 
Court will rely upon the testimony in both hearings in this ruling. 
0074 
L 
FACTS 
"The factual findings of a trial court that underlie its decision to grant or deny a 
motion to suppress will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous." State v. Davis, 
821 P.2d 9, 11. The Court adopts, in part, the facts as set forth in the State's memorandum, 
subject to various significant clarifications made in the hearings. 
On December 22, 1996, officers in Provo, Utah were trying to locate Megan 
Kearley, a sixteen-year-old runaway. Officers received information that Megan might he at 
the Motel 6 in Provo on South University Avenue, and that she was thought to be staying 
with a male individual by the first name of Chad. The officer went to the front desk of the 
Motel 6 and described Megan and "Chad" to the person at the front desk. A teller or 
manager at the front desk indicated that they did have a young female fitting the description 
staying in a room (208 in the preliminary hearing; 263 in the suppression hearing) that was 
rented to a "Chad Staten." They gave the officers the driver's license number which was 
used as identification to rent the room. Dispatch confirmed the license number as Chad 
Staten's. The person at the front desk also said that they thought that Megan had called to 
the room from somewhere else a few minutes before. 
The officer then went across the street and called the room registered to Chad Staten 
and asked for Megan. The male individual who answered the phone said that Megan was not 
there but should be back soon. The male attempted to get the officer to give his name, and 
then there was some discussion in which the officer indicated that it was very important that 
he get in touch with Megan. The male indicated that he thought he knew what the officer 
needed and that he might be able to help him. The officer then asked the defendant if he had 
some "stuff to which the defendant replied that he thought he knew what the officer needed 
and that the officer should call back in ten minutes. Officer Heniger testified that kids that 
have pagers that (the police) deal with usually have some ties with drugs. 
2 
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The officer then began calling the narcotics officers and for back-up. Before the 
r,tUr->r of^ '"" — ' - r ^ r ^ - ^ H e dr_T : - ^ the r--V''nr T and ? female fitting Megan's 
description got out of the vehicle and went into room 263. After waiting a few more minutes 
Officer Heniger called room 263 again and talked to Megan. She said that he should talk to 
"Chad" and handed the phone to him. Defendant told the officer that he could get him some 
"bitch." Officer Heniger testified that "bitch" is a street name for methamphetamine. The 
officer told defendant he would be right over. Megan was then observed leaving room 263 
and entering a vehicle. She was stopped and placed under arrest as a runaway, and she was 
taken into custody. 
Megan had in her possession a small zip-lock baggie of rock methamphetamine. 
She said that she had gotten it from the defendant in the motel room. When Megan was 
placed in custody she requested to be allowed to go up to the room where the defendant was, 
and on the terrace, balcony level of the second level she began to scream about two doors 
from the defendant's room. She continued to scream as the officers then took her back down 
the stairs and secured her. Officer Heniger believed the defendant could hear the screaming, 
and Megan was attempting to alert and warn the defendant that there was a problem. 
Next, the officer asked a friend of Megan's, Tim Hansen, to go with him to room 
263. Officer Heniger explained his reason for taking a civilian appearance as follows: 
The exact reason if he (Staten) saw a uniformed officer and he had already 
offered me narcotics over the phone and if he saw a uniformed officer he 
doesn't have to open up the door. He could just go and flush everything 
down the toilet. (Transcript, Suppression Hearing at 27) 
The officer was to the side where he could not be seen as the defendant opened the 
door. Once the door was opened, the officer stepped out facing the defendant. From this 
position outside the door, the officer could see baggies, a copper pipe and several boxes that 
said "scales" on them. The baggies were similar to the ones that the methamphetamine was 
in that was found on Megan's person. Tim Hansen pointed to the copper pipe and said, 
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"Look, there is a marijuana pipe." Defendant denied it was a marijuana pipe, and when the 
officer asked if the officer could come in to retrieve it, the defendant agreed. The defendant 
denied the officer's request to search the premises; he would not let them search without a 
warrant. 
The officer, from the doorway, and when he entered the room, was able to observe 
several items of paraphernalia in plain view; the copper butane nozzle which both he and the 
civilian thought looked like a marijuana pipe, baggies and a box marked "scales." The 
baggies were identical to the one produced by Megan; very small, an inch by inch baggie 
with a little zip-lock on top. When the officer retrieved the item which was actually copper 
tubing attached to a blow torch, he also noticed several butane torches and several butane 
tanks underneath the same nightstand/desk area. 
The defendant was then "taken into custody" in the room and handcuffed and asked 
to be seated in a chair near the foot of one of the beds. At this point Officer Heniger was the 
only officer in the room. Officer Heniger then made a very cursory search for weapons. 
A loaded, pistol grip, shotgun without a stock, was recovered within a few feet of 
the front door and within "lunge area" of the defendant. The weapon was secured. 
The facts now are muddled, but what is clear is that the officer waited about fifteen 
minutes for NET (Narcotics Enforcement Team) officers to arrive. NET officers 
"inventoried" the items in the room, finding several baggies of methamphetamine, marijuana, 
digital scales and additional shotgun shells. 
A NET officer asked the defendant for identification. The defendant said 
identification was in the planner. A planner had been recovered tucked between the 
mattresses one-half way between the headboard and the foot of the bed. The officer opened 
the planner to obtain the ID and located baggies of drugs and a set of small scales. 
There were no third persons in the motel room until Chad Staten was arrested. But 
there was no testimony whether a bathroom was separate from the sleeping room. 
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It is important to note that Officer Heniger is a new officer, with two years of 
e^^r
:?:' ~\ T "'ion, if :•- :n^nortant tc --~i- •- ' ue is a patrol^'rtr >T°xt, it is irr~-ortant to 
note that the Motel 6 room is small, consisting of two beds, and the nightstand was about ten 
feet from the front door. 
n. 
Consent to Search, Plain View and Exigent Circumstance 
The defendant's argument that he did not give consent to enter the room is 
misplaced. Evidence was in plain view from the doorway. Expectations of privacy do not 
extend to evidence which is in plain view. In addition, there was ample probable cause to 
effectuate an arrest of the defendant, and the officer could have entered the room for that 
purpose without consent or invitation by the defendant. 
Even prior to the officer approaching the defendant's room, the officer had already 
engaged the defendant in a conversation, by phone in which Megan identified the person the 
officer was speaking to as Chad and the individual identified agreed to sell the officer 
controlled substances. At that point the defendant had already arguably committed the crime 
of agreeing to sell controlled substances which gave the officer probable cause for arrest and 
to search for the substances. It was not unreasonable for the officer to assume that there were 
controlled substances in the room since defendant had just agreed to sell him some from the 
room, and Megan had indicated that she had gotten the substances from the defendant in 
room 263. Arguably he had sold or supplied drugs to Megan, a minor, and may have 
harbored a runaway juvenile. Drug paraphernalia was viewed from the doorway and the 
officer had probable cause to arrest him for this offense. 
In the recent case of State v. Well, 304 Utah Advance Reports 6 (November 21, 
1996) the Court of Appeals of Utah stated the basis for determining exigent circumstances. 
The Court stated, 
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Utah courts have identified several exigent circumstances that may justify a 
warrantless search, including the immediate need to prevent harm to the 
officers, destruction of evidence, or escape of the subject. Wells at 8. 
(Citations omitted). 
At least initially, all of the above factors are possible in this case given the fact that 
Megan was attempting to warn the defendant and that the defendant already had reason to be 
suspicious given the phone calls made by the officer and the fact that he was dealing drugs. 
The co-defendant was already under arrest and was attempting to warn the 
defendant. Had officers waited to obtain a warrant, it is likely the defendant may have left or 
the evidence destroyed, secreted or dissipated. 
The Wells court further sets forth the standard as follows: 
As is the standard in all search and seizure cases, whether a search is 
reasonable under the incident-to-arrest exception depends on the particular 
facts of each case. See State v. Austin, 584 P.2d 853 855 (Utah 1978). 
Under this exception, an officer may search the area within the arrestee's 
"immediate control" to prevent the arrestee from obtaining weapons or 
destroying evidence. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 766, 89 S. 
Ct. 2034, 2040-41, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1969); Austin, 584 P.2d at 855; State 
v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 784 (Utah App.), cert denied, 817 P.2d 327 
(Utah 1991). 
The pistol grip, fully loaded, shotgun was recovered within a few feet of the 
defendant. The gun was within the immediate control of the defendant and was properly and 
constitutionally seized. 
Beyond the seizure of the pistol grip shotgun, the court must determine whether a 
further search was allowed under an exigent circumstance or search incident to arrest theory. 
Utah courts have focused on the totality of the factual circumstances to determine if the area 
searched was within the arrestee's immediate control. 
As set forth in Utah v. Austin, 584 P.2d 853, a defendant who is in custody need 
not be physically able to move about in order to justify a search within a limited area once an 
arrest has been made. 
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While handcuffed, this defendant was not further restrained and he could, if he 
;.rsicaS!y movv.. an :int !-: dispositive of 
iv r mtrol." 
State v. Austin, 584 P.2d 853, also stands for the proposition that there are inherent 
differences an arrest at a hotel creates; evidence could inadvertently be removed or destroyed 
by hotel cleaning maids. This motel room is very small and defendant, prior to and past 
constraint, had easy access to the searched area. He was within four feet of the planner, for 
example. 
Finally, the State fails to produce sufficient evidence regarding the motel room 
layout; were there two rooms (a living space and a bathroom) or only one room? If there was 
come .u;,.iii Uc-.in access to ;.u.> loom Weie nerns oi 
cv 
There is no evidence regarding the location of several items which were seized; the 
pager; cellular phone and video tapes. The Court, absent testimony regarding location, cannot 
determine whether the item was within the defendant's "immediate control." Most of the 
evidence comes in under a plain view exception, an exigent circumstance exception, or search 
incident to arrest. But the State has failed to carry its burden as to some evidence. 
Item Seized 
1. Pistol Grip, loaded 12 
guage shotgun, without 
stock 
Suppressed 
No 
Legal & Constitutional 
Justification to Allow 
Evidence 
Exigent circumstance, 
plain view and search 
incident to arrest 
2. Butane torch, 
copper/brass attachments, 
cans of butane 
No Plain view as 
paraphernalia 
0068 
3. Box of scales 
4. Baggies, and baggies 
in shaving kit 
No 
No 
Plain view and search 
incident to arrest witlvn 
suspect's control 
Plain view as 
paraphernalia and search 
incident to arrest within 
suspects' control 
5. Ice Scraper* 
6. Shotgun shells 
7. Scales and baggies 
from planner 
No 
No 
No 
Search incident to arrest 
within suspect's control 
In plain view on 
nightstand and search 
incident to arrest within 
suspect's control 
Search incident to arrest 
within suspect's control 
8. False video tapes 
9. Pager 
10. Cellular phone 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Insufficient testimony as 
to location to determine if 
within suspect's control 
Insufficient testimony as 
to location to determine if 
within suspect's control 
Insufficient testimony as 
to location to determine if 
within suspect's control 
The search incident to arrest was "properly confined to a limited area within the 
*See testimony regarding ice scraper that alerted officers that it contained drugs. 
0067 
.peers control." The se"-?h was limited to :. , l w a from within which Te might gain 
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. Chimel v. California 
III. 
RULING 
Based upon the above facts and the applicable law, defendant's motion is granted in 
-. ;-Oc anc . . part. 
Counsel for defendant is instructed to prepare an order consistent with this ruling. 
Dated this / £ day of July, 1997. 
BY THE COURT 
cc: Sherry Ragan, Esq. 
Randy Spencer, Esq. 
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STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
CHAD STATEN, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND 
REQUEST FOR HEARING 
CASE NO. 971400044 
JUDGE LYNN W. DAVIS 
Defendant, CHAD STATEN, through his counsel of record, Randall K. Spencer, 
moves the Court to suppress evidence gathered subsequent to the warrantless search of 
Defendant and his motel room which resulted in the charges in the present case. Defendant's 
motion is made pursuant to Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution and the Fourth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution. Additionally, Defendant requests that the Court schedule 
this matter for a hearing on Defendant's motion. 
Dated this^Y/ day of March, 1997. 
Randall K. Spencer c-/ 
Attorney for Defendant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be delivered a copy of the foregoing to the Office of 
the Utah County Attorney, 100 East Center, Suite 2100, Provo, UT 84606, this ^ ^ day of_ 
itM i ',-» . 1997. 
'Yl'lcLgcACuvi ^uJotn*-
0022 
Randall K. Spencer (6992) 
UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
Attorneys for Defendant 
40 South 100 West, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone 379-2570 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
CHADSTATEN 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS 
CASE NO. 971400044 
JUDGE LYNN W. DAVIS 
Defendant, CHAD STATEN, through his counsel of record, Randall K. Spencer, 
submits the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
1. On or about December 22, 1996, Officer Henninger from the Provo Police Department 
went to Motel 6 on a belief that a run-away juvenile may be staying at the motel. 
2. Officer Henninger believed that the juvenile was staying with Chad Staten in room 
#263. 
3. The run-away juvenile was apprehended in a vehicle in the motel room parking lot, and 
she produced some methamphetamine that she indicated she got from "the motel room." 
4. Officer Henninger had previously called the motel room and allegedly arranged to 
purchase some methamphetamine from the motel room. 
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5. A civilian, Tim Hansen, was also present to assist in securing the run-away juvenile, 
and Officer Henninger requested that Mr. Hansen accompany him to the motel room where he 
believed Chad Staten was located. 
6. rwncer Henninger instruc .:: ""•••-; Hansen to knock at the door, while ;.-e himself 
stepped out of view. 
7. After Tim Hansen did as the officer requested, Chad Staten opened the door, and the 
•-
 rr
 • .'lep^^d i»ito view and identiH:^ "^"nisc!^  
8. Officer Henninger asked for consent to search the room and Chad Staten did not give 
consent. 
9. Mr. Hansen observed what he believed to be a marijuana pipe on the night stand. 
10. Contrary to what the testimony from Mr. Staten will be, Officer Henninger alleges that 
Mr. Staten consented to Officer Henninger entering the room to retrieve the pipe. 
11. Officer Henninger retrieved the object believed to be a marijuana pipe, and 
immediately discovered that it was not a marijuana pipe, but was part of a butane torch assembly. 
12. Officer Henninger placed hand-cuffs on Mr. Staten, left the room, and Mr. Hansen 
remained outside the motel room to make sure Mr. Staten did not run away. 
13. Officer Henninger told the Mr. Hansen that he was leaving to get a warrant to search 
the room. 
14. Officer Henninger returned shortly after leaving the motel room with additional 
officers, took Defendant into custody, and searched the motel room without a warrant. 
ARGUMENT 
I. MR. STATEN WAS SEIZED AND HIS MOTEL ROOM WAS ILLEGALLY 
2 
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SEARCHED WITHOUT A WARRANT OR EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES. 
A. Mr. Staten did not give consent for Officer Henninger 
to enter his motel room to retrieve the item believed to 
be a marijuana pipe. 
Although a search pursuant to the consent of a person in an area in which that person 
has an expectation of privacy is recognized as an exception to the warrant requirement, the State 
has the burden of proving consent was voluntarily given. See State v. Arroyo. 796 P.2d 684 
(Utah 1990); State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993); State v. Lovegren. 829 P.*2d 155 
(Utah App. 1992). In the present case, Officer Henninger indicated at the preliminary hearing 
that Mr. Staten did not give consent to search his motel room, but that Mr. Staten 
subsequently did consent to Officer Henninger retrieving what he believed to be a marijuana 
pipe. Mr. Staten's testimony at the hearing will be that Officer Henninger asked if he could 
look at what he believed to be a marijuana pipe, and Mr. Staten said fine and turned to get the 
item (knowing that it was in fact not a marijuana pipe). After Mr. Staten turned to get the 
item, Officer Henninger entered the room without Mr. Staten's consent, took the item, placed 
handcuffs on Mr. Staten for "officer safety", and left the room to get a warrant. 
Shortly after Officer Henninger left the motel room after placing handcuffs on Mr. 
Staten purportedly for officer safety, Officer Henninger returned to the room with other officers, 
and again illegally entered Mr. Staten's room without a warrant, and proceeded to search the 
room. "It is settled that a motel guest is entitled to constitutional protection against 
unreasonable searches of his or her room." Stoner v. California. 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964); 
United States v. Anthon. 648 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1981). Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court 
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ii-ic/.---.: :;xbef " :-:..\.\j*on3bie" >_.- • .. v. New 
York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). The Utah Supreme Court has also held that warrantless searches are 
per se unreasonable, and therefore, the exclusionary rule would apply to any warrantless 
:r ;-°- wh--1- -• - • • :v'-:ifiec " ••• - -^rrov-' •'•' •" "':'^ ' 
This court has held that absent one of a narrow category of 
exigent circumstance, warrantless searches are "per se 
unreasonable under the fourth amendment." . . . That 
principle has as much, if not more, force under the Utah 
Constitution." 
State v. Gardner. 814 P.2d 568, 571 (Utah 1991) (emphasis added). It is undisputed that Mr. 
Staten's room was searched without a warrant, and Mr. Staten does not believe that the consent 
exception or any other exception applies to the facts of the present case, and therefore, all 
evidence which was found pursuant to that warrantless search must be suppressed. 
B. Even if the Court finds that the State has over-come 
their burden of proving that Mr. Staten voluntarily 
consented to Officer Henninger entering his room to 
retrieve the alleged marijuana pipe, the result is the 
same. 
Even if Mr. Staten gave limited consent for Officer Henniger's inspection of the copper 
tubing, that consent did not extend to the patently illegal search that followed. The scope of a 
search "is generally defined by its expressed object," Florida v. Jimeno. 500 U.S. 248, 251 
(1991), and "is limited by the breadth of the consent given." United States v. McRae. 81 F.3d 
1528, 1537 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Pena. 920 F.2d 1509, 1514 (10th Cir. 1990), 
cert, denied. 501 U.S. 1207 (1991)). In U.S. v. Beltran. 968 F.2d 21 (10th Cir. (Utah) 1992), the 
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court decided that Beltran's limited consent for the officer to open the truck "and look at the 
furniture" did not permit the subsequent search with a drug-sniffing dog. Though this is an 
unpublished opinion and does not constitute stare decisis, the opinion does have persuasive value 
on a material issue, and a copy is attached to this document. Staten's purported consent for the 
inspection of the tubing did not justify the illegal search that followed. 
Furthermore, the illegality of the search of Staten's room cannot be cured by the 
consent of the motel management. *\1 jne argument is made tnat the search of tne hotel room, 
although conducted without the petitioner's consent, was lawful because it was conducted with 
the consent of the night clerk. We find this argument unpersuasive." Stoner v. California, 376 
U.S. 483 (1964). In two more cases the Supreme Court held searches unconstitutional despite 
the consent of either the proprietor or the assistant manager. See Lustig v. United States, 338 
U.S. 74 (1949); and United States v. Jeffers. 342 U.S. 48 (1951). Therefore, even if the motel 
management did consent to the search of Mr. Staten's room, it does not cure the illegal 
warrantless entry and search. 
II. CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons set forth above, Defendant respectfully requests the Court to 
suppress all evidence seized in violation to the warrantless search of his motel room. 
Dated this ^ f Q day of March, 1997. 
Attorney for Defendant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH# 
Plaintiff, 
CHAD STATEN 
DOB: 6-28-77 
Defendant(s). 
Chad Staten is charged with Possession of Methamphetamine with 
Intent to Distribute in a drug free zone, a First Degree felony; 
Possession of Marijuana with intent to distribute in a drug free zone, 
a Second Degree felony; Possession of Paraphernalia in a drug free zone, 
a Class A misdemeanor; and Possession of a dangerous weapon by a 
restricted person, a Third Degree felony. Defendant waived his 
preliminary hearing and entered pleas of not guilty to the charges on 
March 3, 1997. The matter is currently set for trial on May 9, 1997 
with a pre-trial conference on May 5, 199 7. Counsel for the defendant 
has filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained in this matter. 
FACTS 
On December 22, 1996 Officers in Provo were trying to locate Megan 
Kearley, a 16 year old runaway. Officers received information that 
Megan might be at the Motel 6 in Provo and that she was thought to be 
staying with a male individual by the first name of Chad. The officer 
went to the front desk and described Megan and "Chad" to the person at 
. _ 0045 
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Judge Lynn W. Davis 
the front desk. The person at the front desk indicated that they did 
have a young female fitting the description staying in room 263 and that 
the room was rented to a "Chad Staten". They gave the officers the 
driver1s license number which was used as identification to rent the 
room. The number came back to nu~:? f•--«--*- The person at the front 
desk also said that they thought that Megan had called to the room from 
somewhere else a few minutes before. The officer then went 'across the 
street and called room 263 and asked for Megan. The male individual who 
answered the phone said that Megan was not there but should be back 
soon. The male tried to get the officer to give his name and then there 
was some discussion in which the officer indicated that it was very 
important that he get in touch with Megan. The male indicated that he 
thought he knew what the officer needed and that he might be able to 
help him. The officer then asked defendant if he had some "stuff" to 
which the defendant replied that he thought he knew what the officer 
needed and that the officer should call back in 10 minutes. The officer 
then began calling the narcotics officers and for back-up. Before the 
other officers arrived, a vehicle drove into the parking lot and a 
female fitting Megan's description got out of the vehicle and went into 
room 263. After waiting a few more minutes the officer called room 263 
again and talked to Megan and told her that he wanted some "stuff". She 
said that he should talk to "Chad" and handed the phone to him. 
Defendant told the officer that he could get him some "bitch" meaning 
methamphetamine. The officer told defendant he would be right down. 
Megan was then observed leaving room 263 and entering her vehicle. She 
was stopped and placed under arrest as a runaway as she was in her 
0044 
vehicle. Megan asked if she could go back up to room 263. The officer 
r~id tb-*- 9-^^ could go bacv to the re and Ftc^red to go up the stairs 
\*ith her. •' — she vTrr: coirr no the sT: -..:.::£ Megan starred to scream. She 
continued to scream as the officer took her back down the stairs. She 
was then found to be in possession of methamphetamine which she said she 
had gotten from the individual in room 263 of the Motel 6. The Officer 
•-.a :r ci: . ,., .....'... • ... . \ :",-.rr fr ;. v,;-rre *Mr.. Hanr--:.: 
knocked on the door to the room. The officer was to the side where he 
could not be seen as the defendant opened the door. Once the door was 
opened the officer stepped out facing the defendant. From this position 
outside the door the officer could see baggies, a copper pipe and 
several boxes that said "scales" on them. The baggies were similar to 
the ones that the methamphetamine was in that was found on Megan fs 
person. Tim Hansen pointed to the copper pipe and said, "Look, there is 
a marijuana pipe." Defendant denied it was a marijuana pipe and when the 
officer asked if the officer could come in to retrieve it, defendant 
agreed. The officer retrieved the item which was actually tubing 
attached to a blow torch. Next to the torch was a butane lighter and 
butane fluid was underneath on the night stand. Defendant was placed 
under arrest. Officers inventoried the items in the room and found 
several baggies of methamphetamine, marijuana, digital scales, and a 
Remington 12 ga. Which was loaded. Additional shotgun shells were 
located. 
ARGUMENT 
OFFICERS CAN SEARCH THE ROOM BASED ON EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES AND PLAIN 
VIEW. 
... . 0043 
Prior to entering the defendant' s room at the motel the officers had 
already placed under arrest one of the occupants of the room, Megan 
Kearley. Megan had in her possession, methamphetamine, which she 
claimed she had gotten from the defendant. When Megan was placed in 
custody she requested to be allowed to go up to the room where the 
defendant was and on her way up the stairs started to scream, giving the 
defendant warning that there was a problem. She continued to scream as 
the officers than took her back down the stairs and secured her. In the 
recent case of State v. Wells, 3 04 Utah Advance Reports 6 (November 21, 
1996) the Court of Appeals of Utah stated the basis for determining 
exigent circumstances. The court stated, 
Utah courts have identified several exigent circumstances that may 
justify a warrantless search, including the immediate need to 
prevent harm to the officers, destruction of evidence, or escape of 
the subject. Wells at 8. (Citations omitted). 
All of the above factors are possible in this case given the fact that 
Megan was attempting to warn the defendant and that the defendant 
already had reason to be suspicious given the phone calls made by the 
officer and the fact that he was dealing drugs. "The mere possibility 
that a suspect may have a weapon . . . or that evidence might be 
destroyed . . . is insufficient." Wells at 8. The Wells case goes on 
to say that the State had failed to even intimate that there was any 
immediate concern for safety or destruction of evidence. Id. At 8c 
Such is not the case here where the co-defendant was already under 
arrest and was attempting to warn the defendant. Had officers waited to 
obtain a warrant it is likely that the defendant may have been long 
gone. 
•_ . 0042 
Rather than enter the room at this point the officers elected to try and 
talk tc zhe defendant through another individual who knocked on the 
door. Once defendant came no the door the officer riadf himselr known no 
the ....... ;• . "..: ""'.. ' rr ri . r; :.:. _ "••/a;.; T o l a red l;r -. -a . a or; e 
knocking on the door and by the officer standing outside in the public 
area. From that area, the officer, and the friend of Megan1 s family-
could see something that appeared to be paraphernalia. The officer then 
uskea for consent to go in ana get it and this consent was given by the 
defendant. Both the officer and the other witness will testify that 
this occurred thus given the officer permission to be in the room where 
he then saw, in plain view, other items of concern. Defendant was then 
placed under arrest for the possession of paraphernalia and based on the 
information the officer had obtained from the earlier contact with the 
defendant where the defendant had agreed to sell controlled substances. 
The subsequent search of the room and finding of controlled substances, 
etc. were pursuant to arrest and as part of the inventory of the items 
in the room. State v. Wells at 9 and State v. Austin. 584 P. 2d 853 
(Utah 1978). 
BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT HAD AGREED TO SELL METHAMPHETAMINE, THE OFFICER 
HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST HIM AND SEARCH THE ROOM PURSUANT TO ARREST. 
Even prior to the officer approaching the defendant's room the officer 
had already engaged defendant in a conversation, by phone in which Megan 
identified the person the officer was speaking to as Chad and the 
individual identified agreed to sell the officer controlled substances. 
. _ 0041 
At that point the defendant had already arguably committed the crime of 
agreeing to sell controlled substances which gave the officer probable 
cause for arrest and to search for the substances. It was not 
unreasonable for the officer to assume that there were controlled 
substances in the room since defendant had just agreed to sell him some 
from the room and Megan had indicated that she had gotten the substances 
from the defendant in Room 263. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the state respectfully requests that the 
defendant's motion to suppress be denied. 
Y ATTORNEY 
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Attorneys for Defendant 
40 South 100 West, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84601 
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REPLY MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
vs. 
CHAD STATEN 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. 971400044 
JUDGE LYNN W. DAVIS 
Dciendaiu, CHAD STAIJDN, through his counsel of record, Randall K. Spencer, 
submits the following Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress. 
ARGUMENT 
I. MR. STATEN WAS SEIZED AND HIS MOTEL ROOM WAS ILLEGALLY 
SEARCHED WITHOUT A WARRANT. 
It is undisputed that Defendant's motel room was searched without a warrant, and 
"warrantless searches and seizures within a home or other private premises are per se 
unreasonable absent exigent circumstances." State v. Beavers. 859 P.2d 9, 13 (Utah App. 1993). 
It is also clear that Defendant has an expectation of privacy in his motel room just like his 
expectation of privacy in his home. Hoffa v. United States. 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966) (UA hotel 
room can clearly be the object of Fourth Amendment protection as much as a home or an 
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office")- The law is also clear that even with probable cause to arrest, an officer cannot enter a 
suspect's home or motel room without consent or exigent circumstances. Beavers, 859 p.2d at 
13; Pavton v. New York. 445 U.S. 573, 576 (1979). Therefore, in the present case, the State has 
the burden of overcoming the presumption of unreasonableness and proving that Officer 
Henninger acted pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant requirement such as consent 
or probable cause accompanied by exigent circumstances. 
A. THE CONSENT EXCEPTION DOES NOT SAVE THE 
UNREASONABLE WARRANTLESS SEARCH. 
In order for the State to meet their burden of proving that Defendant consented to the 
warrantless search, and therefore, waived his Fourth Amendment rights, the State must show 
"clear and positive testimony that the consent was 'unequivocal and specific' and 'freely and 
intelligently given'. . . . we indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of 
fundamental constitutional rights and there must be convincing evidence that such rights 
were waived" State v. Ham. 910 P.2d 433, 439 (Utah App, 1996) (emphasis added). 
Relative to whether Defendant consented to allowing Officer Henninger to enter his 
room, relevant testimony was heard at the May 9, 1997 hearing from Officer Henninger, 
Timothy Hansen, a citizen witness, and Chad Staten, Defendant. The testimony was 
undisputed that in response to Officer Henninger's general desire to search Defendant's motel 
room, Defendant clearly and unambiguously stated that Officer Henninger could not search his 
room without a warrant. (Suppression Hearing at p. 9, lines 9-12 and p. 41, lines 15-21). 
Subsequently, Officer Henninger and Timothy Hansen, who did not know Defendant 
and was employed by the Officer to accompany him to the room, noticed an object they 
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lx-:.: -red to be ."iin--p"••. * OiYic-v Henn ine^ askeo ;.e could louk i. -he object, and 
jJeicndaiu ^aiu yc&, Knowing that the object was not a marijuana pipe. However , there is 
dispute as to whether Chad gave consent for the Officer to enter the room and look at the 
objec t or wive!:k- ddvid interne' ; i r retrieve the 'veer :;rd show it to the Ofivcer. 
Office- Henninger indicated at the suppression hearing that he asked Defendant, "is 
it all right if I can go grab it?", and Defendant said, "Yes." (S.H. at p. 29 , lines 8-11). On 
cross-examination, the Officer was asked, "And when you saw the marijuana pipe, you asked 
if you could look at it, didn't you?", and the Officer replied, "I did." (S.H. at 34, lines 16-
18). Officer Henninger's interpretation of the conversation was that he had consent to enter 
the room. 
Defendant 's testimony at the suppression hearing was that, "Yes, I told him he 
would have to have a warrant in order to look in [the motel room]," (S.H. at 4 1 , lines 17-18) 
and then there was a conversation about the alleged marijuana pipe: 
Q: (By Mr. Spencer) And then was there a conversation also 
about the pipe? 
A: (By Defendant) Yes. 
Q: Did you have any objection to him looking at the pipe? 
A: N o . 
Q: And, how did you intend to let him look at the pipe? 
A: I turned around to grab it for him and when I turned around 
to hand it to him and I didn't plan on him coming in. 
Q: And so when you told him that he could look at the pipe, you 
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didn't have any objection to him looking at the pipe? 
A: I was going to hand it to him. 
Q: And that is not the way it worked out, is that right? 
A: No. 
(S.H. at p. 41, line 19 through p. 42, line 10). Therefore, Defendant's intent in telling Officer 
Henninger that he could look at the pipe was that Defendant would retrieve the pipe and show 
it to him, and not that the Officer could enter the room without a warrant and get the pipe. 
Thus, according to Defendant, he did not consent to Officer Henninger entering his motel 
room for any reason. 
Timothy Hansen's testimony relative to whether Defendant consented to Officer 
Henninger entering the motel room to retrieve the pipe is consistent with Defendant's 
recollection. Mr. Hansen indicated that when Officer Henninger asked about the pipe, 
Defendant said "he could look at the pipe. He didn't stipulate if he could go in or not." (S.H. 
at p. 13, lines 16-17). 
The facts gleaned from the testimony of the three witnesses who were present when 
entry to the motel room was made must be applied to the standard set forth in State v. Ham, 
that any waiver of rights must be clear and specific supported by positive testimony and every 
reasonable presumption will be made against the waiver of rights. Ham. 910 P.2d at 439. In 
the present case, there is no testimony of a clear, specific, unequivocal waiver of rights, and 
the Court is bound to resolve the ambiguity of whether Defendant merely consented to Officer 
Henninger looking at the pipe from outside the motel room or whether Defendant consented to 
Officer Henninger entering the motel room to look at the pipe in favor of the presumption 
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Offic \U\ : : r - ^;1 e ' .: < r i;- :---orel roo:r r . . ' Officer Henn;r:-er r.:':?d to loo" 
at the pipe thinking that he would enter the room to look at the pipe, and Defendant said that 
Officer Henninger could look at the pipe thinking that he would get the pipe and show it to 
Officer Hennhrer--kno\\ r•:;; ihat it was not a marijuana pipe and having previously advised the 
Officer that he could not search Defendant's room without a warrant. 
The state of mind of Officer Henninger about whether he believed he had consent or 
not is irrelevant. According to Ham, it is the state of mind of the person waiving rights that is 
the focus of the analysis relative to consent. kL In light of the facts of the present case, this 
Court must find as a matter of law that the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment did not 
justify the Officer's warrantless entry into Defendant's motel room, and therefore, all evidence 
found subsequently, must be suppressed. 
Additionally, Officer Henninger testified that after he retrieved the pipe, Defendant 
was placed in handcuffs to secure the scene, and Defendant was not arrested until 
approximately 20 minutes later when a N.E.T. officer arrived. (S.H. at p. 32 line 25 through 
p. 33, line 6). After Defendant was placed in handcuffs for officer's safety, there were 
periods of time when everyone left the room but Defendant. Timothy Hansen testified that: 
Q: (By Mr. Spencer) And then after Mr. Staten was handcuffed 
and the officer retrieved the pipe, the officer left the room as 
you recall? 
A: (By Timothy Hansen) For a second yes. 
Q: And so nobody else was in the room besides Mr. Staten? 
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A: Yes. 
Q: And then were you left there to watch Mr. Staten to make 
sure that he didn't run? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And where did the officer go? 
A: To get the other cop. 
Q: So did he go down to the first level or did he stay on the 
second level of the Motel 6? 
A: I think he went down to the first level. I don't know. 
Q: But at any rate, you were the only one there to make sure 
that Mr. Staten didn't run? 
A: Right. 
Q: This was after the officer had retrieved the pipe and came 
back? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Came back out of the room? 
A: Yes. 
Q: How long would you say that you were there watching Mr. 
Staten before? 
A: Not, maybe a minute, not too long. 
(S.H. at p. 10, line 7 through p. 11, line 8). Therefore, after Officer Henninger entered the 
room and retrieved the alleged pipe, he subsequently left the room without placing Mr. Staten 
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most they could have done is requested Mr. Staten to exit the room in order for them to take 
their hand-cuffs off of his wrists. 
De;.:» »nt"^  uncontroxened testimony also indicates that the officers came and went 
from his motel room without consent or arresting Defendant: 
Q: (By Mr. Spencer) How much time would you say passed 
between the time that you were handcuffed and then placed in 
the chair until Officer Billings arrived? 
A: (By Mr. Staten) Maybe 20 minutes. 
Q: And during that time, was there always an officer inside the 
room with you? 
A: Not inside the room. He stepped out on the balcony 
Q: Did Officer Henninger actually leave the room during part or 
some of that time? 
A: Yes. 
(S.H. at p. 43, lines 14-23). Thus, according to the uncontroverted testimony of Defendant, 
after Officer Henninger left the room, the second officer, Officer Woodall, stepped out on the 
balcony during the 20 minute wait for the arrival of the N.E.T. officer. Because Defendant 
had not been placed under arrest, the officers had no right to come in and out of his motel 
room until they ultimately decided to search further and arrest him. 
Although valid consent obviates the need for a warrant, Utah Supreme Court 
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holdings promote the maxim that warrants-when-practicable is the best policy. See State v. 
Larocco. 794 P.2d 460, 469 (Utah 1990). "[Warrantless searches will be permitted only 
where they satisfy their traditional justification, namely, to protect the safety of police or the 
public or to prevent the destruction of evidence." HL at 469-70. Additionally, the Utah Court 
of Appeals addressed a matter where there was a question as to whether the officers had 
received valid consent (in that matter the issue was whether the consent from a third party was 
valid, but the rational is the same as the present case): 
Neither of these justifications existed in the case at hand. The 
officers knew that defendant would be out of town for a few 
more days and that there was, therefore, no danger of the 
evidence being destroyed or removed. Nor was there any 
danger to the public or to the police officers. . . .At a minimum, 
the officers should have been concerned about the reality of 
[daughter's] authority, despite her claim, when confronted with 
the objective indicia that she had no such authority. Such doubts 
should have been resolved either by calling [Mother] or, 
preferably, by securing a warrant. The best advice remains: 
"When in doubt, get a warrant." United States v. Gooch. 603 
F.2d 122, 126 n. 3 (10th Cir. 1978). 
State v. Elder. 815 P.2d 1341, 1345, n. 5. (Utah App. 1991). 
When there is a question as to whether consent has been given, it is the officer's duty 
to clarify the consent before relying upon consent to search without a warrant. In the present 
case, the fact that Defendant initially advised Officer Henninger that he could not enter 
Defendant's motel room and search without a warrant and the ambiguous language in the 
subsequent alleged request for consent to look at the pipe demonstrates that there was no valid 
waiver of Fourth Amendment rights at any time, and all evidence seized subsequent to the 
officers' illegal entries must be suppressed. 
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The State argued in its memorandum in opposition to Defendant's motion to suppress 
that exigent circumstances justified Officer Henninger's entrance into the motel room. Not 
only were there no exigent circumstances at the time of Officer Henninger's entrance into the 
motel room, but Officer Henninger's testimony at the suppression hearing and the preliminary 
hearing make it clear that he did not enter Defendant' motel room based on the presence of 
exigent circumstances, but he entered the room because he allegedly thought, although, 
unreasonably, that Defendant had consented to his entering the room. The State's argument 
that Megan Kearly was screaming to warn Defendant was inconsistent with Officer 
i leiiiiix-^cr's testimony that Megan sia J scre.-niiing when she saw her brother ana his friend, 
and was screaming at them. (S.H. at p. 26 and 27). Officer Henninger testified simply that it 
was possible that Defendant heard Megan's screams. 
Officer Henninger's thought processes were clearly demonstrated in his testimony. 
He wanted Defendant to open the door to the hotel room, and he knew that Defendant would 
not open the door for him and that he did not have the right to force Defendant to open the 
door. Therefore, Officer Henninger attempted to take Megan to the motel room to entice 
Defendant to open the door for Megan, and then the Officer could confront Defendant. 
Relative to why Officer Henninger agreed to take Megan to the room, he testified: "I figured 
the person in the room that first offered me the narcotics over the phone [would] be more apt 
to opening up the door for her instead of a uniformed officer and you know the possibility of 
destroying evidence." (S.H. at p. 26, lines 5-8) When Officer Henninger's first plan did not 
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work out, he subsequently employed Timothy Hansen to go up to the room with him. When 
asked why he wanted to go to the room with Tim Hansen, Officer Hen?v>.^ev r'*s:ifie^: s 'nhe 
exact same reason, if he saw a uniformed officer and he had already offered me narcotics over 
the phone and if he saw a uniformed officer he doesn't have to open up the door. He could 
just go and flush everything down the toilet." (S.H. at p. 27, lines 21-24). 
"Utah courts have identified several exigent circumstances that may justify a 
warrantless search, including the immediate need to prevent harm to the officers, destruction of 
the evidence, or escape of the suspect." State v. Wells. 928 P.2d 386, 389 (Utah App. 1996). 
The state contends that any of those possibilities justified the warrantless search in this instance. 
If Officer Henninger believed there was an exigent circumstance such as danger to anyone, he 
certainly would not have taken two civilians up to the room. The Defendant was inside a 
second floor motel room with at least three officers on the scene, and therefore, the possible 
escape of the suspect is not an exigent circumstance that was present. In fact, the only 
possible exigent circumstance that Officer Henninger identifies is the possibility that Defendant 
may destroy evidence. However, Officer Henninger does not articulate any reasonable 
suspicion for this concern other than the possibility in any case that evidence may be 
destroyed. "Because '[t]here is almost always a partisan who might destroy or conceal 
evidence,' United States v. Davis, 423 F.2d 974, 979 (5th Cir. 1970), the State must show 
more than 'a mere possibility that evidence might be removed,' People v. Blasius. 459 
N.W.2d 906, 916 (Mich. 1990). The State failed to present evidence 'that even intimated that 
the officers reasonably believed that destruction, removal or concealment of contraband 
material was imminent or threatened.' State v. Peterson. 525 S.W.2d 599, 607 (Mo.Ct.App. 
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motel room, and cannot have been created by the officers' own actions. See Beavers, 859 P.2d 
a- IS and ac-. ^panyTig ck;n.'-.•;>'. d'ven if 0!Ti=. •.- I :-'inii;igc:- believed thai there r::as a fear of 
destruction of evidence, it was a result of his repeated efforts to entice Defendant to open the 
door to the civilian, but regardless, once Defendant opened the door and expressed a 
v .•;•• •'::.;. ..-•_.. :.;.ik with •;.:. , rnv r ,^h fear ^^ : - • 4 and cannot justify a subsequent 
entry into the home to retrieve an object that appeared to be a marijuana pipe. It is cl^ar that 
Officer Henninger's entry into the home was not to out of fear for safety or loss of evidence, 
but was for the purpose of gathering evidence pursuant to the purported consent of Defendant. 
Clearly, the exception of exigent circumstances ciue^  not justify Officer Henninger's 
warrantless entry into Defendant's room. 
If the Court should find any exigent circumstance, any such exigent circumstance 
was created by the efforts of Officer Henninger to entice Defendant to open the door to the 
motel room by bringing up two separate civilians to knock on the door as discussed above. 
III. THE SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST EXCEPTION ALSO DOES NOT 
APPLY TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE 
The only circumstance where the search incident to arrest doctrine would even be 
relevant to the present case would be if the Court denies Defendant's motion based on the fact 
that the officers did not have either consent or exigent circumstances to enter Defendant's 
room. However, even the search incident to arrest doctrine does not justify the search made in 
the present case. Officer Henninger and Billings did not even claim that they conducted a 
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search incident 10 arrest. However, they claimed that they did an inventory search at the 
request of Motel 6 management not a search incident to arrest. (See testimony of Officer 
Billings at the preliminary hearing held on February 24, 1997 p. 27, line 17 through p. 28, 
line 2; and testimony of Officer Henninger at S.H. at p. 30, line 17 through p. 31 line 10). As 
argued in Defendant's primary memorandum, Motel 6 management did not have authority to 
consent to the search of Defendant's room, and Defendant is not aware of any exception to the 
warrant requirement which allows an inventory search without a warrant to be conducted at a 
motel room. Therefore, the evidence found must be suppressed. 
Relative to searches incident to arrest in general, a warrantless search may be 
conducted incident to an arrest for two specific reasons: (1) to prevent the arrestee from 
obtaining weapons or (2) destroying evidence. Chimel v. California. 395 U.S. 752, 766 
(1969); State v. Wells. 928 P.2d 386, 390 (Utah App. 1996); State v. Austin. 584 P.2d 853, 
855 (Utah 1978). The scope of the search is very limited until a warrant is obtained— 
consisting of the grab area of a defendant and objects in plain view. "The prevailing view is 
that when a warrantless search is justified, any evidence seized 'in plain view' will be 
admissible." Austin at 856. In State v. Wells, the court held that the search was unreasonable 
because the evidence was discovered in a jacket lining in another room, and was therefore not 
in plain view. 
In the present case, Defendant had been hand-cuffed and left in the room for at least 
20 minutes before the officers decided to arrest and search him. Officer Henninger conducted 
a search for weapons and for his safety at the time he initially placed hand-cuffs on Defendant, 
and located the shotgun—this was apparently a quasi-search incident to arrest. After Defendant 
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because Officer Henninger had already conducted a search for Officer's safety at least 20 
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If the court finds that the inventory search was also a search incident to arrest, the 
officers exceeded the scope of a search incident to arrest. A search of the area within the 
arrestee's immediate control may be conducted to check for weapons and preserve evidence. 
See Chimel v. California. 395 U.W. 752, 763, 766 (1969); and State v. Wells. 928 P.2d 386, 
390 (Utah App. 1996). Defendant was handcuffed (had been for at least 20 minutes), at least 
three officers were present, and the controlled substances were found in the inside pocket of a 
zipped planner and inside the handle of an ice scraper. (S.H. at p. 44, lines 2-17 and p. 35, 
lines 4-15) The evidence was not readily accessible to Defendant. The evidence was in no 
danger of being destroyed. The State must prove "under Chimel. that defendant was or 
anyone else would be within a range close enough to obtain possession [or] destroy the 
evidence or that the officers were reasonably checking for weapons." Wells. 928 P.2d at 391. 
In consideration of the facts of this case, it is clear that the officers were conducting an 
unjustified inventory search without a warrant and not a search incident to arrest. 
IV- CONCLUSION 
For aSi the reasons set forth above, Defendant respec;fully reqaests the Court to 
suppress all evidence seized in the warrantless search of his motel room. 
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Dated this ^ day of May, 1997. 
vRandall K. Spence? 
Attorney for Defendant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be delivered a copy of the foregoing to the Office of 
the Utah County Attorney, 100 East Center, Suite 2100, Provo, UT 84606, this T day of. 
*~TiW 1997. 
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